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Since the Supreme Court's controversial decision in Kelo v. City of
New London,l state legislatures across the country have been struggling
with the same question: under what circumstances is it appropriate for the
government to utilize its power of eminent domain to take privately-owned
property without the owner's consent? The right of eminent domain refers
to the inherent power of every independent government to take privately
owned land within its borders. 2 The exercise of eminent domain within the
United States is limited by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, which
provides that "private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without
just compensation."'3 Since the taking of private property is limited to situa-
tions that serve a "public use," the interpretation of this term controls the
force of the limitation. Historically, the taking of private property to build a
school 4 or a public road5 has been deemed to satisfy the public use re-
quirement because the new use of the land is available to, and directly
benefits, the public at large. However, the legality of taking privately
owned land for the sole purpose of economic development is much less
settled. This issue was central in Kelo,6 where the city of New London
condemned several non-blighted private properties as part of a redevelop-
ment project. 7 The Supreme Court approved these takings, and held that
"there is no basis for exempting economic development from our tradition-
ally broad understanding of public purpose."' 8 This decision has caused
* J.D. Candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2009; B.S., Finance, Lewis University, 2003.
The author would like to thank Professor Bernadette Atuahene for her insight and guidance in drafting
this article.
1. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
2. Miss. & Rum River Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4. Searl v. Sch. Dist. No. 2 in Lake County, 133 U.S. 553, 564 (1890).
5. W. River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. 507, 533 (1848).
6. 545 U.S. at 472.
7. Id. at 475.
8. Id. at 485.
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great unrest, as many Americans now fear that their homes and businesses
are susceptible to government takings.
The use of eminent domain to facilitate economic development within
Illinois is not uncommon. A recent survey prepared by the Chicago Trib-
une indicates "that local governments have used eminent domain more than
250 times in the last five years to seize private property for economic de-
velopment." 9 Often, the threat of condemnation is sufficient to convince
property owners to accept the government's best offer for their land in or-
der to avoid costly legal proceedings. This was the case in Lake Zurich,
Illinois, where several local property owners reluctantly reached an out-of-
court settlement to sell their land to the city. 0 The Village of Lake Zurich
had begun condemnation proceedings against the owners with the intent to
build restaurants, condominiums, and a parking garage on the land as part
of its redevelopment plan. "1
The Kelo Court "emphasize[d] that nothing in [its] opinion precludes
any State from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings
power."' 12 In response to this invitation, states across the nation have recon-
sidered and revised their statutes pertaining to eminent domain in an effort
to provide a proper definition of public use. 13 In Illinois, State Senator
Susan Garrett introduced the Equity in Eminent Domain Act ("Eminent
Domain Act") with the intent of "strik[ing] a balance by enabling economic
development while providing adequate protection and due process for
property owners."' 14 This bill was signed into law by Governor Rod Blago-
jevich on July 28, 2006, and went into effect January 1, 2007.15 The provi-
sions of this legislation spell out the situations in which eminent domain
powers may be utilized in Illinois, as well as the considerations that will be
employed in determining just compensation. 16
The swift action taken by the Illinois legislature in response to Kelo
shows that the state government recognizes the dangers associated with
economic takings. However, the broad definition of blight utilized under
the Eminent Domain Act leaves a substantial opportunity for local govern-
9. Crystal Yednak, Eminent Domain Bill Pushed: State Senators Seek Limits to Aid Owners, CHI.
TRIB., Jan. 31, 2006, § 2 (Metro), at 3.
10. Susan Kuczka, Eminent Domain Fight Squashed, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 21, 2006, § 2 (Metro), at 7.
11. Id.
12. 545 U.S. at 489.
13. See National Conference of State Legislatures, Eminent Domain: 2006 State Legislation,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/natres/emindomainleg06.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2008) for a list of bills
considered or passed by the state legislatures since the Kelo decision.
14. State Senator Susan Garrett, Update on Eminent Domain Legislation, http://www.garrett98.
con/eminent domain.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2008).
15. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 30/99-5-5 (2006).
16. Id. § 30/5-5-5.
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ments to condemn land primarily for financial gain. In order to ensure that
the private property rights of Illinois citizens are protected, the definition of
blight in the Eminent Domain Act needs to be revised.
This note examines the public use provisions of the Illinois Eminent
Domain Act in light of United States Supreme Court and Illinois Supreme
Court precedents, and then suggests a new definition of blight that will
ensure that the goals of the Eminent Domain Act are accomplished. Al-
though just compensation is an essential consideration in condemnation
proceedings, this note does not address the issue of compensation under the
belief that no amount of compensation is "just" if the taking is not for a
proper public use. 17 In Part I, this note examines the development of the
Supreme Court's "traditionally broad understanding of public purpose ' 18
by examining several of the Court's landmark eminent domain cases. Part
II traces the evolution of the Illinois Supreme Court's public use doctrine
from its original narrow interpretation to the court's current standard. Part
III explains the public use provisions of the Eminent Domain Act, and dis-
cusses whether each provision helps to achieve the Act's goal of balancing
private property rights with the government's desire to employ eminent
domain for economic development. In Part IV, this note explores the origin
of blight as a public purpose to satisfy the Public Use Clause, and suggests
a modified definition of blight for Illinois in order to ensure that the Emi-
nent Domain Act will achieve its goal. Finally, Part V discusses the ramifi-
cations of allowing economic takings to continue under the current broad
definition of blight in Illinois.
I. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT EMINENT DOMAIN CASES:
THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS A BROAD INTERPRETATION OF PUBLIC USE
The power of eminent domain within the United States is limited by
the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, which provides that "private
property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation."' 9
The Supreme Court's interpretation of this clause establishes the "federal
baseline," or the outermost limits, for the exercise of eminent domain
within the states. 20 Although the Court has always held that a purely private
taking is unconstitutional,21 it has emphasized that its role in determining
17. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477. ("[I]t has long been accepted that the sovereign may not take the prop-
erty of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B, even though A is paid just
compensation.").
18. Id. at 485.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
20. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489.
21. Id. at 477.
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whether a taking is "for a public purpose is an extremely narrow one."'22
Thus, the Court has shown great deference to legislatures in determining
what qualifies as a public use to satisfy the constitutional limits, 23 and has
essentially invited the states to set their own limits on public use.
24
A. Decisions Prior to 1950
In the decade after the Fifth Amendment was ratified, the Supreme
Court wrote that "[i]t is against all reason and justice, for a people to en-
trust a Legislature with SUCH powers" as to create "a law that takes prop-
erty from A[] and gives it to B."'25 Although the case being decided did not
involve the use of eminent domain, this axiom has consistently been quoted
in the Court's decisions regarding the Public Use Clause for the principle
that property cannot be taken from one private party and given to another.26
In light of this principle, eminent domain has traditionally been used to
acquire land for roads, canals, mills, and other projects that are available to
the public at large. 27 Accordingly, many early state court decisions "en-
dorsed 'use by the public' as the proper definition of public use."' 28 How-
ever, from the early 1900s the Supreme Court has found this definition
"inadequa[te] ... as a universal test" because it believes that under certain
circumstances the public welfare requires the taking of one individual's
land for the benefit of another. 29 Instead, the Court adopted the "public
purpose" standard that was first announced in Fallbrook Irrigation District
v. Bradley.30 In Fallbrook, the Court upheld the taking of one individual's
land to construct an irrigation ditch that would provide a water source to
another individual's land.31 The Court chose not to apply the "use by the
public" standard, and held that "[i]t is not essential that the entire commu-
nity or even any considerable portion thereof should directly enjoy or par-
ticipate in the improvement in order to constitute a public use. '32 This
broad interpretation of the Public Use Clause has evolved into the Court's
current standard.33
22. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
23. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 482.
24. Id. at 489.
25. Calder v- Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798).
26. See, e.g., W. River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. 507, 537 (1848).
27. Id. at 533.
28. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 479.
29. Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 531 (1906).
30. 164 U.S. 112, 158-164 (1896).
31. Id. at 161-62.
32. Id.
33. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480.
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In the same year that the Court established the "public purpose" stan-
dard in Fallbrook, it announced in United States v. Gettysburg Electric
Railway Co. that "when the legislature has declared the use or purpose to
be a public one, its judgment will be respected by the courts, unless the use
be palpably without reasonable foundation." 34 This statement spawned the
Court's "longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments" in the
area of eminent domain. 35 Although the Gettysburg Court suggested that a
court's role in reviewing the merits of a public use declaration should be
increased when the land is not going to be used by the government, 36 this
limitation on judicial deference has not withstood the test of time.
The potential problems arising from a broad interpretation of the Pub-
lic Use Clause combined with great deference to legislative determinations
of public use were recognized long before the standards were adopted by
the Court. One land owner faced with the threat of condemnation in the
1840s argued that since the state alone has the power to determine when the
use of eminent domain is necessary, if the state is also allowed to determine
what purposes satisfy the public use requirement, then the Public Use
Clause provides no limitation at all. 37 However, the Court has not been
persuaded by this argument, and has consistently held that deference to
legislative decisions is proper because the legislature is more familiar with
the circumstances creating the necessity for the taking. 38
B. Berman v. Parker
The Court's broad interpretation of public use and its policy of great
deference to legislative determinations were cemented in Berman v.
Parker, where the Court held that private property may be condemned and
transferred to private developers in an effort to redevelop slum areas and
remove urban blight. 39 The Berman Court's decision came on the heels of
several state court decisions upholding blight removal as a proper public
use even when the condemned land is immediately transferred to private
developers. 40 At the time Berman was decided, urban areas across the
country viewed the use of eminent domain to facilitate urban redevelop-
34. 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896).
35. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480.
36. Gettysburg, 160 U.S. at 680.
37. W. River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. 507, 520 (1848).
38. See Robert J. Hopperton, Standards of Judicial Review in Supreme Court Land Use Opinions:
A Taxonomy, an Analytical Framework, and a Synthesis, 51 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 1, 16-19
(1997), for a discussion of judicial review in eminent domain cases.
39. 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
40. Wendell E. Pritchett, The "Public Menace" of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private Uses of
Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 38-40 (2003).
2008]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
ment as a necessity because they were facing rapidly deteriorating condi-
tions. 41 While the Court may have wanted to simply carve out an exception
to the Public Use Clause in order to solve a growing problem, its decision
in Berman resulted in a drastic shift in the way courts viewed condemna-
tions. Instead of focusing only on the manner in which the property would
be used after it was condemned, courts could look at the condition of the
property before it was taken to determine if the condemnation satisfied the
Public Use Clause. 42 From this perspective, the condemnation itself could
serve a public purpose since it would eliminate a harmful property use.
Therefore, the subsequent use of the property was irrelevant, since the pub-
lic purpose was already achieved. The merits of blight removal as a public
use to satisfy the Takings Clause are discussed in more detail in Part IV of
this note.
In Berman, the Court analyzed the taking of private property within
the city of Washington, D.C. in accordance with a comprehensive redevel-
opment plan initiated by Congress. 43 Over 60% of the dwellings within the
project area were beyond repair, and many of the other buildings lacked
indoor plumbing and central heating. 44 In light of these conditions, Con-
gress declared that the area was injurious to the public health and that rede-
veloping the area was a public use.45 However, the department store
building that was being condemned in the case before the Court was not in
disrepair, and could not be considered harmful to the community.46 The
business owner argued that taking his property and transferring it to a pri-
vate developer served an unconstitutional private purpose. 47
In deciding to uphold the taking, the Court wrote that "when the legis-
lature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh
conclusive. '48 The Court noted that its role in determining whether the
exercise of eminent domain was for a proper public use is "extremely nar-
row," 49 and held that if Congress decided that "the Nation's Capital should
be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment
that stands in the way."50 Furthermore, the Court held that transferring the
property to a private developer did not negate the public purpose of the
41. Id. at 33-35.
42. Id. at 25-26-
43. Berman, 348 U.S. at 28-29.
44. Id. at 30.
45. Id. at 28-29.
46. Id. at 31.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 32.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 33.
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taking, 51 and that the non-blighted department store could be condemned
because the redevelopment project was to be viewed as a whole rather than
"on a piecemeal basis."'52 In essence, the Berman Court implied that prop-
erty may be taken from A and given to B, as long as the purpose of the
taking is to benefit the public. This reasoning would become the foundation
for the Court's later decisions.
C. Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midliff
Thirty years after upholding the taking of properties in the poorest
neighborhood of Washington, D.C., the Court applied its broad public use
doctrine to the condemnation of properties belonging to the wealthiest citi-
zens of Hawaii. In 1967, the Hawaii legislature enacted laws allowing indi-
vidual tenants to obtain title to the land on which they were living by
asking the government to condemn the property.5 3 The legislature intended
to use these condemnation proceedings to redistribute the island's land,
thereby breaking up the land oligopoly that had existed throughout Ha-
waii's history.5 4 At the time the laws were enacted, nearly 96% of the
state's land was owned either by the government or by one of only seventy-
two private land owners. 55 The legislature found that the consolidated own-
ership of the land resulted in artificially high real estate values, and deter-
mined that redistributing the land would be in the best interest of the
public. 56
One of the land owners faced with condemnation challenged the con-
stitutionality of the Hawaiian law, arguing that the taking would be for a
purely private purpose. On appeal, the circuit court held that the law vio-
lated the public use requirement because it represented a "naked attempt on
the part of the state of Hawaii to take the private property of A and transfer
to B solely for B's private use and benefit. '57 This holding set the stage for
the Supreme Court's next expansion of the Public Use Clause.
To begin its analysis of the Hawaii legislation, the Court reiterated
that great deference must be given to the legislature, and that a compen-
sated taking will not be proscribed by the Fifth Amendment as long as it is
"rationally related to a conceivable public purpose."' 58 The Court then went
51. Id. at 33-34.
52. Id. at 35.
53. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 233 (1984).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 232.
56. Id.
57. Midkiffv. Tom, 702 F.2d 788, 798 (9th Cir. 1983).
58. Haw. Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 241.
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one step further than it had in Berman by expressly stating that eminent
domain may be employed to transfer property directly from one private
entity to another as long as the purpose of the taking serves to benefit the
public. 59
D. Kelo v. City of New London
In light of the Supreme Court's broad interpretation of the Public Use
Clause throughout its prior decisions, its approval of eminent domain pro-
ceedings to condemn non-blighted properties as part of an economic devel-
opment plan should have come as no surprise. In 2000, the city of New
London approved a redevelopment plan that was intended to create new
jobs and increase tax revenues by capitalizing on the arrival of a new Pfizer
Inc. research facility. 60 In order to complete the renovations, the plan re-
quired the acquisition of properties either through purchase or the use of
eminent domain.6' Several home owners, including an elderly woman who
had lived in her home for more than eighty years, challenged the city's
proposed use of eminent domain, claiming that the takings were for a
purely private use since the properties were to be transferred to a private
developer. 62 The area in which the condemned properties were located was
not claimed to be blighted, nor were any of the individual properties. 63
Predictably, the Court began its analysis of the proposed takings by
reaffirming its broad interpretation of the Public Use Clause, as well as its
policy of deference to legislative decisions. 64 In spite of the fact that the
redevelopment plan did not claim to target the elimination of blight or any
other social harm, the Court determined that the "program of economic
rejuvenation" was entitled to its deference and "unquestionably serve[d] a
public purpose. '65 The Court emphasized the importance of the "integrated
development plan" in allowing the transfers to a private developer to be
considered a public use, but stopped short of declaring that the transfers
would have been purely private if executed outside of such a plan. 66
In concluding its analysis, the Court stressed that it was merely estab-
lishing the "federal baseline" for the exercise of eminent domain under the
Public Use Clause, and that states were free to set more stringent limits on
59. Id. at 243-44.




64. Id. at 480.
65. Id. at 483-84.
66. Id. at 487.
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their use of the power.67 It is unclear, however, what takings would be pre-
vented by this "federal baseline." Regardless, Kelo made clear that any
meaningful limitations on the exercise of eminent domain would need to be
established at the state level.
II. ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT CASES: A MORE NARROW
VIEW OF PUBLIC USE
The use of eminent domain within Illinois is limited by the Illinois
Constitution68 and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
which is made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.69 The state and federal constitutions both provide that private prop-
erty may not be taken for public use without just compensation. 70 The
Illinois Supreme Court, however, has employed a more narrow interpreta-
tion of the term "public use" than is applied by the United States Supreme
Court. Although the Illinois Court has softened its original view that "pub-
lic use" literally means "use by the public," it has maintained a larger role
for the courts in determining if a proposed taking is for a public use than is
reserved by the federal courts.
A. The Initial Interpretation of Public Use in Illinois:
Use by the Public
In accord with the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, the
Illinois Supreme Court has always held that the State's right to take private
property without the consent of the owner is limited to cases where the
property is taken for public use. 71 Thus, the legislature cannot take the
property of one citizen and give it to another without the owner's consent. 72
However, the Illinois Supreme Court has shown less deference to legisla-
tive determinations of public use than the federal courts have shown. In
Illinois, it is clear that the legislature's task is to determine when it is nec-
essary to exercise the power of eminent domain, but it is the court's task to
decide whether that exercise of the power is for a public use.73 The Illinois
Supreme Court has emphasized that the power of eminent domain should
be exercised with restraint, and that the security of private property rights
67. Id. at 489.
68. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 15.
69. Sw. I1. Dev. Auth. v. Nat'l City Envtl., 768 N.E.2d 1, 7 (111. 2002).
70. Id.
71. Limits Indus. R.R. Co. v. Am. Spiral Pipe Works, 151 N.E. 567, 569 (Il1. 1926).
72. Id.
73. Chicago & E.I.R. Co. v. Wiltse, 6 N.E. 49, 49-50 (Il1. 1886).
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should not "be overlooked" in a "desire to promote the public good. '74
Therefore, the court has urged the legislature to state the purpose for its use
of eminent domain in a definite manner so that the proposed public use is
clear.7 5
Throughout its decisions in the nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the public must have a subsequent
right to use or access the property in order for a condemnation to be an
appropriate public use. For example, the court held that the legislature
could not condemn land for a right of way over an individual's land with-
out his consent unless the right of way is intended to benefit the community
rather than another individual.76 The court asserted that the property
owner's right to exclude others from his land must be supreme unless the
right of way is needed for use by the public, and that to hold otherwise
would "open the way to other and more serious encroachments upon the
right of property." 77 Similarly, the court held that eminent domain could
not be used to create a right of way between a factory and a local railroad
because the right of way would not be made available to the public and
would exclusively benefit the company. 78 The court reasoned that the "ex-
pression 'public use' ex vi termini implies an interest or right of some kind
in the public," and that parties "condemning property for such purposes
assume certain obligations and duties to the public."' 79 If the company
would have no obligation to allow public access to the right of way, then
the condemnation could not be for a public use.80
In 1903, the court summarized its view of the Public Use Clause in
Gaylord v. Sanitary District of Chicago. The court asserted that in order for
a condemnation to be for a public use, "[t]he public must be to some extent
entitled to use or enjoy the property, not as a mere favor or by permission
of the owner, but by right." 81 This quote would continue to play a role in
the court's opinions throughout the following century, although sometimes
only in dissent, as the court struggled with increasing pressure from local
governments to broaden its view of public use.
74. City of East St. Louis v. St. John, 47 11. 463,466 (1868).
75. Id. at 466-67.
76. Nesbitt v. Trumbo, 39 111. 111, 118 (1866).
77. Id.
78. Sholl v. German Coal Co., 10 N.E. 1992 201 (111. 1887).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Gaylord v. Sanitary Dist. of Chi., 68 N.E. 522, 524 (i11. 1903).
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B. The Effects of Blight Removal on Illinois's Public Use Standard
Similar to its role at the federal level, urban blight played a key part in
leading the Illinois Supreme Court to expand its interpretation of the Public
Use Clause. In the decade preceding the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Berman v. Parker, the Illinois Supreme Court was forced to
decide whether blight removal was a public use in Zurn v. City of Chicago.
In Zurn, the Illinois Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a
law providing the power to utilize eminent domain to transfer blighted
properties to a private corporation for redevelopment. 82 Under the statute,
the government would not have control over the use of the land once the
blight conditions were removed.
83
This law would have been unconstitutional under the Illinois Supreme
Court's traditional interpretation of the Public Use Clause because the con-
demned property would not be made available for use by the public, and
the redevelopment corporation would have no obligation to use the prop-
erty for any public purpose once the blight conditions were removed. How-
ever, the Zurn court upheld the law because the "declaration of public
policy ... by the legislature [wa]s entitled to great weight."'84 Similar to the
Berman Court, the Illinois Supreme Court found that the manner in which
the private corporation would use the land after the redevelopment was
"wholly immaterial." 85 The public use was accomplished once the blight
conditions were removed, and the subsequent use of the land had no effect
on this purpose.
86
The Zurn court's shift away from the traditionally narrow understand-
ing of public use was likely a result of increased pressure being applied by
municipalities in an effort to obtain the power of eminent domain to facili-
tate urban renewal. This type of pressure was increasing in urban areas
across the country during the 1940s. 87 In any event, the shift was not an
unconscious one. Relying on the court's holding in Gaylord, the dissent
asserted that the court must make a distinction between "a purpose which is
to the advantage of the public and a purpose which is for a public use."' 88
Accordingly, the dissent argued that the takings contemplated under this
law were unconstitutional because the public could not assert any right to
82. Zurn v. City of Chicago, 59 N.E.2d 18, 25 (111. 1945).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 22.
85. Id. at 25.
86. Id.
87. Pritchett, supra note 40, at 28-30.
88. Zurn, 59 N.E.2d at 28 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
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use the property, and the private corporation would not have an obligation
to use the land for any public purpose after the initial removal of the blight
conditions. 89 The majority rejected this argument, evidencing a willful
movement towards a broader understanding of the Public Use Clause.
C. The Illinois Supreme Court's Current Interpretation of Public Use
The Illinois Supreme Court established its current public use doctrine
in Southwestern Illinois Development Authority v. National City Environ-
mental, L.L.C. (SWIDA). 90 In 2002, the SWIDA court established limits
for condemnations that satisfy the Public Use Clause by precluding the use
of eminent domain when the primary purpose of the condemnation is to
foster economic development and the primary beneficiary is a private en-
tity.91 The court explicitly rejected the notion that the legislature's determi-
nation of public use is beyond judicial scrutiny, and asserted that "[t]he
power of eminent domain is to be exercised with restraint, not abandon. '92
In SWIDA, a private corporation that owned a race track attempted to
obtain land from a neighboring business in order to build a parking lot.
When the business refused to sell the land, the race track owner contacted a
local redevelopment corporation to initiate condemnation proceedings,
asserting that the acquisition of the land would serve a public use because it
would promote economic development and increase tax revenues. 93 The
court began its analysis of the proposed taking by acknowledging the def-
erence owed to legislative decisions regarding the use of eminent domain,
but then asserted that the ultimate determination of whether the power is
being employed for a public use is a judicial function. 94 The court cited its
nearly one-hundred-year-old holding in Gaylord for the proposition that a
taking cannot satisfy the public use requirement simply by benefiting the
public in some incidental manner. 95 Rather, the public must have some
vested right in the use of the land.96 In light of these principles, the court
held that the condemnation was unconstitutional because the race track
owner's primary purpose in taking the land was to increase its private prof-
its rather than to serve the public.97
89. Id. at 29.
90. 768 N.E.2d 1 (111. 2002).
91. Id. at 11.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 4.
94. Id. at 8.
95. Id. at 9.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 11.
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While the court stated that the public need not take possession of the
property to satisfy the Public Use Clause, its citation to Gaylord signaled a
clear intention to return to a more narrow interpretation of public use. Spe-
cifically, the court emphasized that "revenue expansion alone does not
justify an improper and unacceptable expansion of the eminent domain
power," and that eminent domain should be used with restraint.98
III. THE ILLINOIS EQUITY IN EMINENT DOMAIN ACT
The public outcry against the Supreme Court's ruling in Kelo was
heard throughout the country, and Illinois was no exception. Private prop-
erty owners feared that their homes or businesses could be taken without
their consent any time the government found a new use for the property
that would generate more tax revenue. However, many municipalities ar-
gued that eminent domain reform in Illinois was unnecessary in light of the
Illinois Supreme Court's holding in SWIDA. 99 In their view, Illinois case
law already prevented the taking of private property for purely economic
considerations, and there was no reason to impose additional restrictions on
the use of eminent domain power within the state. Many municipalities rely
on the power of eminent domain to modernize and improve their cities in a
cost effective manner, and do not want unnecessary restraints placed on the
power. Illinois residents and business owners have countered these argu-
ments by asserting that local governments regularly condemn private prop-
erty for economic development in spite of the Illinois Supreme Court
precedent, and that additional limitations on the use of eminent domain are
necessary to strengthen individual property rights. Evidence in support of
this view can be found in a recent Chicago Tribune study showing that
eminent domain has been used more than 250 times for economic devel-
opment in just six Illinois counties during a five-year period. 100
Faced with these two opposing views, State Senator Susan Garrett in-
troduced legislation in an attempt to codify the Illinois Supreme Court's
holdings, and to clarify the rights and protections of Illinois property own-
ers that are faced with condemnation proceedings. 101 The bill was designed
to reach an accord between the individuals seeking stronger private prop-
erty rights and the government entities lobbying for broad eminent domain
powers. According to Senator Garrett's website, "[t]he objective of the
98. Id. at 10-11.
99. See, e.g., Brian Martin, Eminent Domain in Illinois After Kelo, ITIA NEWSL. (I11. Tax Incre-
ment Ass'n, Springfield, II1.), Fall 2005, at 4, available at http://www.illinois-tif.com/Resources/News
letters/2005FallNewsletter.pdf.
100. Yednak, supra note 9, at 2.
101. State Senator Susan Garrett, supra note 14.
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legislation is to strike a balance by enabling economic development while
providing adequate protection and due process for property owners." 102
After several amendments in the House of Representatives, the bill intro-
duced by Senator Garrett was approved by the General Assembly and
signed into law as the Eminent Domain Act. 
103
This section explains the public use provisions of the Eminent Domain
Act, and provides commentary on whether each provision weighs in favor
of strong private property rights or the government's ability to employ the
power of eminent domain for economic development. Finally, this section
highlights the provisions that weigh most heavily on each side of the debate
that the legislation is designed to balance.
A. The Public Use Provisions of the Eminent Domain Act
The Eminent Domain Act establishes five categories of public use un-
der which the power of eminent domain may be utilized in Illinois. Each
category describes a set of purposes for which eminent domain may be
employed, and sets the burden of proof for establishing the public purpose.
It is important to note that the provisions of the Eminent Domain Act "do
not apply to the acquisition of property under the O'Hare Modernization
Act"' 04 or to the "acquisition or damaging of property in furtherance of the
goals and objectives of an existing tax increment allocation redevelopment
plan."'105 In order for a tax increment allocation redevelopment plan to be
exempt from the provisions of the Eminent Domain Act, the plan must
have been established prior to April 15, 2006 and have included property
assembly costs as of that date. 106 The exemption for tax increment financ-
ing districts weighs heavily in favor of the municipal governments seeking
to utilize eminent domain for economic development, and will be discussed
in more detail below.
The first category of public use established by the Eminent Domain
Act provides the authority to take property for public use and public con-
trol.' 0 7 In order to satisfy the Public Use Clause under this subsection, the
"condemning authority must prove that: (i) the acquisition of the property
is necessary for a public purpose; and (ii) the acquired property will be
owned and controlled by the condemning authority or another governmen-
102. Id.
103. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 30/1-1-1 (2006).
104. Id. § 30/5-5-5(a-5).
105. Id. § 30/5-5-5(a-10).
106. Id.
107. Id. § 30/5-5-5(b).
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tal entity." 108 This category of takings encompasses the traditional types of
condemnations that allow for the construction of public roads, government
buildings, and other related projects. There is no doubt that the takings
authorized under this subsection would satisfy even the narrowest interpre-
tation of the Public Use Clause. Therefore, this subsection has no effect on
the current public use debate.
A second category of public use created by the Eminent Domain Act
provides the authority to take property for private use or private control so
long as the property will be utilized for a qualifying purpose. 10 9 The Public
Use Clause is satisfied under this subsection when the condemning author-
ity proves by a preponderance of the evidence that: (i) the acquisition of the
property is necessary for a public purpose; (ii) an enforceable written
agreement has been or will be executed to ensure that the acquired property
will be utilized for the proposed purpose for at least forty years; and (iii)
the acquired property will be applied to one of nine specific purposes. 110
The qualifying purposes include: 1) a project incorporating residential units
for low-income households; 2) mass transportation facilities; 3) public
utilities; 4) railroad use; 5) waste disposal facilities; 6) open space and
parks; 7) libraries or museums; 8) charter schools that are open to the pub-
lic; and 9) historic resources and landmarks. 111 The majority of these pur-
poses are likely to satisfy a narrow interpretation of the Public Use Clause
because the property will be made available for use by the public in the
traditional sense approved by the Illinois Supreme Court in Gaylord v.
Sanitary District of Chicago.112 However, advocates for strong private
property rights are likely to take exception to the provision allowing con-
demnation of property for the purpose of building housing units for low-
income households because the provision allows the acquired property to
be developed for "mixed-use" projects that include non-residential proper-
ties. In addition, the provision requires only 20% of the residential units to
qualify as low-income housing. 113 As a result, this provision leaves sub-
stantial room for condemnations that are motivated primarily by economic
considerations, and weighs in favor of the municipalities.
The third category of public use established by the Eminent Domain
Act provides the authority to take property for public ownership and private
108. Id.
109. Id. § 30/5-5-5(e).
110. Id.
Ill. Id.
112. 68 N.E. 522, 524 (111. 903).
113. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 30/5-5-5(e)(1).
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control if the property will be used for certain specified purposes. 1 4 In
order to comply with the Public Use Clause under this subsection, the con-
demning authority must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: (i)
the acquisition of the property is necessary for a public purpose; (ii) the
acquired property will be owned by the condemning authority or another
governmental entity; and (iii) the acquired property will be used in the "op-
eration of a university, medical district, hospital, exposition or convention
center, mass transportation facility, or airport." ' 1 5 In general, these pur-
poses are likely to face little opposition from property rights advocates
because the use of the property will directly benefit the public as a whole.
However, this subsection does leave some room for economic develop-
ment. According to State Representative John Bradley, the sponsor of the
bill in the House of Representatives, this subsection is intended to allow for
the use of eminent domain to acquire land for "the Starbucks Coffee that's
in the county hospital" and the "Avis Rent A Car that's in... an airport" in
addition to acquiring land for the principal facility.
16
The fourth public use category created by the Eminent Domain Act af-
fords the authority to condemn property for private use and private control
provided that the primary basis for the condemnation is the elimination of
blight.117 The Public Use Clause is satisfied under this subsection so long
as the condemning authority proves by a preponderance of the evidence
that: (i) the acquisition of property is necessary for a public purpose, (ii) the
property to be acquired is located in an area that has been designated as a
blighted area or a conservation area, (iii) the required blighting factors ex-
isted in the area at the time of the designation or any time thereafter if the
existence of such factors is challenged within six months of the date the
condemnation is filed, and (iv) at least one of the three following require-
ments is satisfied: (A) the condemning authority has entered into a written
agreement with a private entity to redevelop the area that details the rea-
sons for which the property is required; (B) the acquisition and proposed
use of the property are consistent with a regional redevelopment plan
adopted in the last five years; or (C) the acquired property will be used in
accordance with a comprehensive redevelopment plan, and an enforceable
agreement has been executed to ensure that the use of the property will
remain consistent for at least forty years." 8
114. Id. § 30/5-5-5(0.
115. Id.
116. See 122nd Leg. Day, 94th Gen. Assembly, at 17 (Ill. 2006), available at http://ilga.gov/house/
transcripts/htrans94/09400122.pdf (transcript of Illinois House of Representatives Regular Session).
117. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 30/5-5-5(d).
118. Id.
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The Eminent Domain Act does not define the term blight. Instead, it
relies on the definition set forth in the Tax Increment Allocation Redevel-
opment Act1 19 as the default definition. Blight is defined using ambiguous
factors such as dilapidation, obsolescence, deterioration, and lack of venti-
lation.120 As a result of the vague terms used in this definition, this subsec-
tion of the Eminent Domain Act creates the most expansive opportunity for
municipalities to exercise the power of eminent domain for purely eco-
nomic reasons. The provisions of this subsection are the focus of Part IV of
this note.
The final category of public use established by the Eminent Domain
Act is designed to govern takings that do not fall into one of the other four
categories, and is described by Representative Bradley as a "catch-all"
provision.]21 Under this subsection, the condemning authority "must prove
by clear and convincing evidence that the acquisition of the property for
private ownership or control is: (i) primarily for the benefit, use, or enjoy-
ment of the public; and (ii) necessary for a public purpose" in order to sat-
isfy the Public Use Clause. 122 The burden of proof on the condemning
authority is higher under this subsection than any of the others. However,
the two requirements set forth above are rebuttably presumed to be satisfied
if the power to condemn the property is granted under one of the several
statutes listed in the subsection, or if the primary purpose for the condem-
nation is the elimination of blight. 123 Thus, condemning authorities have
the option of proceeding under this "catch-all" provision even when the
taking would normally fall under one of the other categories. This may be
an attractive option when the condemning authority believes that it can
meet the higher burden of proof, because this subsection does not include
the detailed restraints on the subsequent use of the property that are con-
tained in some of the other subsections. The effect of including this "catch-
all" provision will not be known until the courts decide what types of con-
demnations will satisfy the heightened burden of proof. Therefore, it is
difficult to predict which side of the public use debate will benefit from this
subsection.
119. 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-74.4-3(a)(West 2006).
120. Id.
121. See 122nd Leg. Day, 94th Gen. Assembly, at 17 (Ill. 2006), available at http://ilga.gov/house/
transcripts/htrans94/09400122.pdf.
122. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 30/5-5-5(c) (2006).
123. Id.
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B. The Eminent Domain Act's Key Provisions in Favor of
Private Property Rights
The Eminent Domain Act significantly strengthens the rights of pri-
vate property owners by increasing the burden of proof on the condemning
authority in two ways. First, under the blight clearance category, the Emi-
nent Domain Act requires the condemning authority to prove that the nec-
essary blighting factors actually existed in the area at the time that it was
designated as a blighted area or at some point thereafter. 124 Prior to the
enactment of this legislation, a condemning authority could create a strong
presumption of blight by simply declaring that an area was blighted. 125 The
owner of the property bore the burden of proof to show that his property
did not contain the alleged blighting factors. 126 This shift in the burden of
proof should significantly increase the ability of private property owners to
contest an allegation of blight because they no longer have to produce suf-
ficient evidence to overcome a strong presumption on the side of the con-
demning authority. Rather, the condemning authority has the burden to
produce evidence of each alleged blighting factor, and the property owner
can challenge each assertion on a level playing field. As stated by bill
sponsor John Bradley, this shift is a "substantial win[] for private landown-
ers in the State of Illinois."'127
Private property owners also achieved a significant victory in the
Eminent Domain Act's provisions that require a condemning authority to
prove that the specific property to be acquired is necessary for the proposed
public purpose. Courts have long held that once the public use has been
established, it is within the legislature's discretion to determine what prop-
erty is to be acquired. 128 According to bill sponsor Susan Garrett, these
provisions are intended to increase the burden on the condemning authority
by "requir[ing] the condemning authority to prove the property is essential
to the success" of the proposed project. 129 This requirement should help to
prevent the taking of surplus property that is not vital to the achievement of
the public purpose.
124. Id. § 30/5-5-5(d).
125. Reed-Custer Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. v. City of Wilmington, 625 N.E.2d 381, 385 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993).
126. ld.
127. 122nd Leg. Day, 94th Gen. Assembly, at 13 (Il1. 2006), available at http://ilga.gov/house/
transcripts/htrans94/09400122.pdf.
128. See, e.g., Bernan v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35-36 (1954) ("Once the question of the public
purpose has been decided, the amount and character of the land to be taken for the project and the need
for a particular tract to complete the integrated plan rests in the discretion of the legislative branch.").
129. State Senator Susan Garrett, supra note 14.
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C. The Eminent Domain Act's Key Provisions in Favor
of Economic Development
Illinois municipal governments lobbied fervently against the initial
draft of the Eminent Domain Act because they believed it would signifi-
cantly reduce, if not eliminate, their ability to redevelop obsolete areas
within their communities in a cost effective manner by needlessly restrict-
ing their power to obtain property through eminent domain. 130 These lob-
bying efforts were successful in at least two ways. First, the municipalities
were able to convince the legislature to exclude existing Tax Increment
Financing districts from the provisions of the Eminent Domain Act. Sec-
ond, the lobbyists were successful in maintaining the state's broad defini-
tion of "blight."
Municipalities lobbied extensively to exclude existing Tax Increment
Financing districts (TIFs) from the provisions of the Eminent Domain Act
so that existing projects would not be subjected to the Act's increased re-
strictions on the use of eminent domain. 13 1 As a result of this lobbying,
TIFs that were established prior to April 15, 2006 are not governed by the
provisions of the Eminent Domain Act, and therefore can continue to em-
ploy eminent domain in accordance with the laws in effect prior to the
Act. 132 According to the Illinois Tax Increment Association, TIFs are de-
signed to help rebuild "run-down" or "economically sluggish" communities
by freezing the amount of tax revenues made available to the local commu-
nity at the time of the TIF designation, and diverting all future increases in
tax revenue to use in the redevelopment projects. 133 Under the Tax Incre-
ment Redevelopment Act, municipalities may exercise eminent domain
within a TIF in order to achieve their goal of economic redevelopment. 134
Currently, there are 375 TIFs in Cook County alone, representing approxi-
mately 9% of the properties located in the county. 13 5 Given the prevalence
of TIFs in Illinois, and the fact that a TIF designation can last for up to
twenty-three years, the exclusion of these areas from the provisions of the
Eminent Domain Act creates a significant opportunity for municipalities to
exercise eminent domain for purely economic purposes.
130. Yednak, supra note 9.
131. 122nd Leg. Day, 94th Gen. Assembly, at 15 (I11. 2006), available at http://ilga.gov/house/
transcripts/htrans94/09400122.pdf.
132. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 30/5-5-5(a-10) (2006).
133. What is Tax Increment Financing?, Illinois Tax Increment Association Frequently Asked
Questions, http://www.illinois-tif.com/FAQl .asp (last visited Mar. 28, 2008).
134. 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-74.4-3(a) (West 2006).
135. See Press Release, Cook County Clerk's Office, County TIF District Report Released (Aug.
15, 2006), available at http://www.cookctyclerk.com/sub/news-view.asp?NEWS ID=89.
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Municipalities seeking to utilize eminent domain powers for economic
development will also benefit from the fact that the Eminent Domain Act
does not include a definition of blight. Although condemning authorities
are now required to prove the existence of blighting factors, the blighting
factors contained in the TIF statute, which serves as the default definition
of blight, are quite vague and easy to manipulate. 136 In addition, the oppor-
tunity to employ eminent domain for economic development is expanded
by the fact that condemning authorities are only required to show blighting
factors in the area rather than in the particular property that is to be con-
demned. 137 Part IV of this note further explores the meaning of blight un-
der Illinois law, and asserts that a new definition is needed in order to finish
balancing the strength of private property rights with the power of the local
governments to utilize eminent domain for economic development.
IV. DRAWING THE LINE FOR PUBLIC PURPOSE: DEFINING BLIGHT
Eminent domain cases involving the elimination of blight and slum
areas have played a very significant role in broadening the interpretation of
the Public Use Clause at both the state and federal level. It is now well
settled that private property may be condemned in order to eradicate a
blighted area "regardless of the subsequent use of the property."1 38 The
elimination of blighted areas is said to be a public use because such areas
are "detrimental to the health, safety, morality or welfare" of the public. 139
However, many states, including Illinois, have failed to establish a concrete
definition of what constitutes a blighted area. Instead, many blight defini-
tions are based on vague concepts such as dilapidation, obsolescence, and
lack of community planning. These amorphous terms have allowed mu-
nicipalities to acquire properties for economic development when the origi-
nal use of the property was in no way detrimental to society. This section
explores the origin of the term blight in the context of eminent domain
proceedings, discusses the current definition of blight under Illinois law,
and suggests a new definition of blight in order to align the meaning of the
term with the stated goal of eliminating property uses that are harmful to
society.
136. See 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-74.4-3(a) for a list of blighting factors.
137, 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 30/5-5-5(d).
138, Sw. Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Nat'l City Envtl., 768 N.E.2d 1,9 (11. 2002).
139. Zurn v. City of Chicago, 59 N.E.2d 18, 23 (Ill. 1945).
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A. The Development of Blight as a Public Use
In the first half of the twentieth century, there was a major push for
urban redevelopment in many American cities-one spurred by deteriorat-
ing conditions within the city limits and the mass exodus of middle and
upper class citizens from the cities to the outlying suburbs. 140 Sections of
the cities, referred to as slums, were plagued with high crime and rundown
buildings. In this context, the term "blight" was created to describe the
conditions that spawn slum areas. 141 Blighting factors, such as decaying or
overcrowded buildings, were viewed as a disease that would turn a healthy
section of the city into a slum if they were not eliminated. 142 It was asserted
by advocates for urban renewal that these blight conditions resulted from a
lack of proper urban planning, 143 and that only large scale redevelopment
could eliminate these conditions and guarantee the survival of the urban
neighborhoods. 144
The power to obtain these blighted properties through the use of emi-
nent domain was seen as an essential component of urban renewal because
private developers would not be willing to invest large amounts of capital
in low-income areas without the added incentive of low acquisition
costs. 145 The advocates for employing eminent domain to facilitate large
scale urban redevelopment included city politicians that wanted to increase
tax revenues, housing reformers that wanted to improve urban living condi-
tions, and private developers that wanted to seize an opportunity to obtain
large amounts of potentially profitable land for a relatively low cost. 146
Renewal advocates viewed the Public Use Clause as the main obstacle
to urban redevelopment because they feared that courts would not allow the
use of eminent domain to secure privately owned property for redevelop-
ment that was to be carried out by private corporations. 147 In order to over-
come this obstacle, the activists urged courts to focus on the condition of
the property prior to being condemned rather than the subsequent use of the
property after the condemnation. 148 This tactic proved to be very success-
ful, as evidenced by the Illinois Supreme Court's ruling in Zurn149 and the
140. Pritchett, supra note 40, at 13-14.
141. Id. at 16-18.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 17.
144. Id. at 18-19.
145. Id. at 29.
146. Id. at 14.
147. Id. at 13.
148. Id. at 26.
149. Zurn v. City of Chicago, 59 N.E.2d 18, 25 (111. 1945).
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United States Supreme Court's ruling in Berman.' 50 Each of these courts
held that eliminating blighted areas is a public purpose regardless of the
subsequent use of the property. Once blight removal was approved as a
public purpose to satisfy the Public Use Clause, the process of taking pri-
vately owned land for economic development became routine. A munici-
pality could obtain the power to take a desired property by simply asserting
that the surrounding area was blighted. Since a firm definition of blight has
never been established in most jurisdictions, municipalities have been
shown great deference by the courts in determining what areas are blighted
and need to be redeveloped.
B. The Current Definition of Blight in Illinois
According to State Senator Steven Rauschenberger, "[t]he statutory
definition of blight in Illinois is broader than the Mississippi River at its
mouth," and has led to "everything from underdeveloped lakefront property
to open green-grass farmfields ... being defined as blighted."'151 Senator
Raushenberger's statement illustrates the expansive manner in which mu-
nicipalities have utilized blight removal as a method to obtain desired prop-
erties through eminent domain. In recent years, Illinois municipalities have
been successful in applying the blight designation to a multitude of differ-
ent properties, including thriving shopping plazas, 152 suburban resi-
dences, 153 and even a Jimmy John's sandwich shop. 154 While blight was
originally used to describe deteriorating urban neighborhoods with high
crime rates, it has become a rhetorical tool used to facilitate the govern-
ment's ability to condemn properties for economic development. This de-
parture from its original meaning has been made possible by the vague
factors used to define blight, combined with the courts' almost complete
deference to legislative determinations of blight.
In spite of the weaknesses of the current definition, the Illinois legisla-
ture decided not redefine blight in the Eminent Domain Act. Instead, the
Eminent Domain Act relies on the definition contained in the Tax Incre-
ment Redevelopment Act as its default definition. 155 Under the Tax Incre-
150. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
151. Maura K. Lannan, States Scramble After Court 's Land-Grab Ruling, BRONZEVILLEONLINE,
July 20, 2005, http://www.bronzevilleonline.com/newsarchive/eminentdomain.htm.
152. John Stossel, Property Owners Win One: Target Won't Build Store on 'Blighted' Property in
Illinois, ABC NEWS, June 13, 2007, http://abcnews.go.com/2020/story?id=3273932.
153. Kuczka, supra note 10, at 7.
154. Jonathan Bilyk, EMINENT DOMAIN: 'The Hammer is Smaller' Cities, Property Owners
Mull Impacts of New State Law, MYWEBTIMES, Aug. 12, 2006, http://mywebtimes.com/ottnews/ ar-
chives/ottawa/display.phpid=265443.
155. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 30/1-1-5 (2006).
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ment Redevelopment Act, an improved property is blighted if any five of
thirteen factors are "present" and "reasonably distributed" in the area sur-
rounding the property. 156 The required blighting factors include dilapida-
tion, obsolescence, deterioration, the presence of structures below code
standards, illegal use of structures, vacancies, lack of ventilation or light,
inadequate utilities, overcrowding, deleterious land use, environmental
clean-up, lack of community planning, and decreasing property values.157
The statute does not indicate what percentage of the area must be affected
by these factors in order for the area to qualify as blighted, but it is clear
that the factors do not have to be present in the particular property that is
being condemned.
Given the ambiguous nature of the factors listed in the statute, it is
easy to see how a municipality can find sufficient evidence to declare al-
most any neighborhood blighted. However, the main defect in this defini-
tion is that the factors used to determine blight do not focus on the stated
purpose of the law. The statute indicates that the removal of blight is neces-
sary because it threatens the health, safety, morals, and welfare of the pub-
lic, 158 but it does not indicate how the factors used to determine blight are
related to this purpose. For example, it is unclear how the "absence of sky-
lights" 159 or land parcels of "inadequate shape and size" 160 threaten the
public's safety in any way. While these factors are useful in identifying
areas that would benefit from economic development, they are virtually
irrelevant in determining what areas pose a significant threat to public
safety. As it is currently defined, any area that is not economically prosper-
ous can be declared blighted. Therefore, the term must be redefined in or-
der to prevent the use of eminent domain for purely economic takings.
C. A New Definition ofBlight in the Context of Eminent Domain
The broad terms that define blight under current Illinois law invite lo-
cal governments to apply the term to any area that is not thriving economi-
cally. While this broad application of the term may be appropriate under
statutes that are intended to spur economic development, such as the Tax
Increment Redevelopment Act from which the definition is borrowed, it is
not suitable for an area of the law that is to be "exercised with restraint." 161
156. 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-74.4-3(a)(I) (West 2006).
157. Id. § 5/11-74.4-3(a)(1)(A) to (M).
158. Id. § 5/11-74.4-2(b).
159. Id. § 5/11-74.4-3(a)(1)(G).
160. Id. § 5/11-74.4-3(a)(1)(L).
161. Sw. I11. Dev. Auth. v. Nat'l City Envtl., 768 N.E.2d 1, 11 (111.2002).
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The Illinois Supreme Court has held that blight removal satisfies the Public
Use Clause, whereas economic development alone does not. 162 In order to
give force to this differentiation, the definition of blight must require more
than a lack of financial viability. Unless the term blight is redefined, the
Eminent Domain Act will fail to achieve its goal of balancing the rights of
private property owners with the economic interests of local governments
because eminent domain will continue to be employed for purely economic
benefits under the pretense of blight removal.
Blight removal satisfies the Public Use Clause because it eliminates
property uses that are "detrimental to the health, safety, morality or wel-
fare" of the public.' 63 Accordingly, the existence of blight should be based
on the presence of property uses that pose a direct threat to public safety. In
light of this purpose, this note proposes a new definition of blight in the
area of eminent domain as follows:
(1) An area within a municipality qualifies as a "blighted area" if:
(A) at least 35% of properties within the area qualify as
"blighted properties" as defined under this section; or
(B) the rate of violent crime in the area is significantly higher
than the rate of violent crime in the municipality as a
whole. 164
(2) An individual property is deemed a "blighted property" if one or
more of the following criteria is satisfied:
(A) the property contains one or more structures that have con-
tinuously violated one or more building codes designed to
protect the health or safety of the public for a period of at
least one year;
(B) the property contains one or more residential structures that
are not fit for human habitation;
(C) the property contains one or more structures that have been
proven by clear and convincing evidence to pose a direct
threat to the health or safety of the public;
(D) the property contains environmentally hazardous conditions
that pose a direct threat to the health or safety of the public;
(E) the property is comprised of a vacant lot within a developed
community that poses a direct threat to the health or safety
of the public; or
(F) the property qualifies as an abandoned property.
162. Id.
163. Zurn v. City of Chicago, 59 N.E.2d 18,23 (I11. 1945).
164. In order to implement this definition, a determination would have to be made as to how large
or small of an area could be designated as a single "blighted area."
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There are two main advantages to this definition compared to the cur-
rent definition of blight found in the Tax Increment Redevelopment Act.
First, the factors used to define blight are directly related to the stated pub-
lic purpose of ensuring the health and safety of the public. Second, the
proposed definition establishes a clear threshold for the government's abil-
ity to condemn non-blighted properties within a larger blighted area.
Unlike the factors employed by the current definition, the factors used
to establish blight in the proposed definition are all directly related to the
safety and welfare of the public. Therefore, condemnations brought under
the proposed definition are certain to serve the public purpose of protecting
the public welfare by eliminating harmful property uses. Municipalities
may argue that the proposed factors for determining blight are too restric-
tive, but the definition maintains a reasonable level of flexibility by allow-
ing for a finding of blight whenever "a direct threat to the health or safety
of the public" can be proven. Furthermore, the definition of blight should
be restrictive since the use of eminent domain is to be "exercised with re-
straint." 165
Proponents of economic takings argue that large scale redevelopment
often requires the condemnation of non-blighted properties within a
blighted area in order to prevent holdouts seeking to receive above-market
value for their property and to ensure that the area is redeveloped in a con-
sistent manner. Under current Illinois law, a property containing no indica-
tions of blight may be condemned if it is located in an area where blighting
factors are "present" and "reasonably distributed"'166 provided that the area
is being redeveloped as part of a comprehensive plan. 167 However, the
terms "present" and "reasonably distributed" are not defined, thus leaving
many property owners without notice of when they may face condemna-
tion. In order to protect the rights of these owners while allowing for large
scale redevelopment plans, the proposed definition of blight requires that at
least 35% of the properties within a designated area qualify as blighted
properties before a non-blighted property may be condemned. As a result,
comprehensive redevelopment plans may be carried out in the areas that
need it the most, while owners of non-blighted properties have clear notice
of when they face potential condemnation proceedings.
165. Sw. IlL. Dev. Auth, 768 N.E.2d at 165.
166. 65 ILL. COMP. STAT ANN. 5/11-74.4-3 (West 2006).




The people suffering the consequences of allowing government tak-
ings for purely economic purposes "will not be random."'168 The "losses
will fall disproportionately on poor communities" that are ill-equipped to
defend their property rights against the strong economic power and politi-
cal influence of corporations and development firms. 169 These disadvan-
taged communities have few resources, and therefore rely heavily on the
Constitution to protect their private property rights. Unfortunately, the
sanctioning of economic takings has rendered these people virtually power-
less in their efforts to defend their property rights against businesses that
seek to redevelop the land for financial gain. While the owners will receive
"just compensation" for their property, "no compensation is possible for the
subjective value of these lands to the individuals displaced and the indig-
nity inflicted by uprooting them from their homes."' 170
The Illinois legislature recognized the inherent dangers associated
with government takings that are motivated solely by economic considera-
tions, and took a strong step towards limiting these dangers by passing the
Eminent Domain Act. However, the amorphous definition of blight relied
upon by the Eminent Domain Act creates a substantial opportunity for local
governments to take land primarily for financial gain. Regrettably, this
broad definition of blight leaves many communities vulnerable to an ex-
pansive use of eminent domain. In order to eliminate this problem and
achieve the Eminent Domain Act's goal of balancing the interests of pri-
vate property owners with the interests of local municipalities, the Illinois
legislature should adopt the more restrictive definition of blight set forth in
this note.
168. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 505 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 521 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
170. Id. See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957
(1982), for a discussion on the relationship between property rights and the ability to "achieve proper
self-development."
[Vol 83:2
